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Abstract 
This article analyzes the current status of indexing investment performance in China and the characteristics of fund 
managers and fund management companies. It also theoretically analyzes the influence of these factors on indexing 
investment performance in terms of fund governance structure, characteristics of fund managers and fund 
companies, stock selection ability and timing ability. Next, it uses multiple regression analysis from three 
dimensions mentioned above to verify the influencing factors on investment performance. The results show that 
in terms of passive investment, fund tracking error is significantly negatively correlated with institutional holdings 
and fund managers’ stock selection ability, and significantly positively correlated with fund managers’ timing 
ability. Female fund managers’ tracking errors are smaller. Institutional investors play a positive role in promoting 
the performance of active investment. The fund manager’s stock selection ability can effectively reduce the fund’s 
sensitivity to target index fluctuations, and the fund manager’s timing ability can significantly improve the 
performance of fund allocation. Funds allocated by female fund managers will be less sensitive to target index 
fluctuations. 
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1.Analysis on the Current Status of Indexing Investment Performance in China 
1.1 Asset allocation method and investment performance 
Securities asset allocation methods are generally divided into two categories: active investment and passive 
investment. There are two important products in indexing investment market of China, namely passive index funds 
and enhanced index funds. The former completely passively replicates the index, while the latter uses most of the 
assets for passive investment, but at the same time uses a small portion of assets for active investment. 
Different tracking target indexes have different components and even asset classes, which will cause certain 
interference when comparing the investment performance of different asset allocation methods. Therefore, this 
paper selects the CSI 300 Index and the index funds with the CSI 300 Index as tracking targets to compare the 
investment performance of passive and enhanced index funds. 
Judging from the overall change trend of the CSI 300 Index in 2019, it is showing a tortuous upward trend 
(as shown in Figure 1.1). Among them, the CSI 300 Index fluctuated greatly in the first quarter. It rose from 3000 
points at the beginning of the year to more than 4000 points, an increase of more than 33.3%. It can be seen that 
the Shanghai stock market was generally good at that time, and a significant decline appeared from the second 
quarter, after which, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Index showed a creeping upward trend and returned to a high of 
4000 points at the end of the year. From the perspective of trading volume, the peak of trading volume was mainly 
concentrated in the first half of the year, especially during the period when the market rose sharply. At that time, 
the trading volume was close to 35,000. It can also be seen that trading volume indirectly promoted the 
development of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets to a large extent. The overall transaction volume in the 
second half of the year tended to stabilize, basically hovering around 10,000. It can be seen from the annual moving 
average that the fluctuation range in the first half of the year was large, and the market tended to stabilize in the 
second half of the year. 
The tracking error and daily rate of return of passive funds are less than enhanced funds. Figure 1 classifies 
the index funds according to the type, and plots the relationship between the tracking error and the rate of return 
of different funds according to the grouping of passive funds and enhanced funds. From the figure, we can clearly 
see that the tracking error of passive funds in general is significantly smaller than that of enhanced funds; 
correspondingly, the daily return rates of enhanced funds are mostly higher than passive funds. However, this 
conclusion is not absolute. In the lower part of the left picture, we can see that there are several passive funds with 
high tracking errors and enhanced funds with low daily rate of return. This may be related to the characteristics of 
the fund itself. From the perspective of the degree of dispersion, the concentration degree of passive funds is 
significantly higher than that of enhanced funds. This is due to the relatively small degree of differentiation of 
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Most fund investments are concentrated in the manufacturing and financial industries, which have the 
characteristics of low tracking error and high daily rate of return. In Figure 2, we divide funds in terms of the 
investment ratios in different industries. On the whole, most investments made by funds are mainly concentrated 
in the manufacturing and financial industries. Some funds are concentrated on the upper left side of the right chart, 
which is characterized by low tracking error and high daily rate of return. And the fund on the upper right side of 
the picture, from the perspective of the distribution of investment industries, this fund is significantly different 
from others. Industries of its fund investments are more scattered, including manufacturing, finance, education, 
health and social work, business and leasing, among which the investment ratio in the financial industry is 
significantly smaller than others. Therefore, it is preliminarily judged that the high tracking error characteristic of 
this fund may be largely related to the investment composition of the fund, and investment in the financial industry 
is likely to be effective in reducing tracking error. 
Passive funds perform better in terms of tracking errors, but enhanced funds have better performance in terms 
of their ability to adjust to market changes and the rate of return per unit risk. Figure 1.3 compares six performance-
related indicators of the passive fund and the enhanced fund in terms of tracking error, beta, Sharpe ratio, Treynor 
ratio, Jensen ratio and information ratio. First of all, from the point of view of tracking error, whether it is calculated 
by absolute value method or standard deviation method, the tracking error of passive funds is significantly smaller 
than that of enhanced funds. However, the tracking error obtained by using different methods is still different in 
different types of funds. Among them, the tracking error calculated according to the absolute value method is 
significantly smaller than the standard deviation method, and the gap between the upper and lower quartiles in the 
enhanced fund by using the standard deviation method is also significantly higher than the absolute value method. 
Because tracking error is a commonly used indicator to measure fund performance. We can preliminarily judge 
from the above figure that the performance of passive funds is better than enhanced funds. 
Since the beta value is mainly used to quantify the volatility of individual investment instruments relative to 
the entire market, the higher the beta value of a security, the greater the potential risk and the higher the investment 
income, and vice versa. From the figure above, it can be seen that the difference in the beta value of passive funds 
is small and the value is large, while the difference in beta value of the enhanced fund is relatively large and the 
value is small, so it can be seen that passive funds bear higher potential risks. 
Since the Sharpe ratio reflects the ability of fund managers to adjust to market changes, a higher value usually 
means that the fund has a better performance. From the figure above, we can see that for passive funds, the 
difference in Sharpe ratio is not obvious, while the Sharpe ratio of enhanced funds also shows differentiated 
characteristics due to the difference in investment strategies of different fund managers. In terms of the numerical 
distribution of the Sharpe ratio, passive funds are mainly concentrated between 0.1 and 0.12; while the Sharpe 
ratio of enhanced funds has a larger distribution span, mainly concentrated between 0.1 and 0.14, which also 
reflects from the side that the ability of enhanced funds to adjust to market changes is stronger than passive funds. 
Judging from the distribution of the Treynor, the value of enhanced funds is significantly higher than that of 
passive funds, which mainly reflects the relationship between income and market risk, and whether the market is 
in an up or down period, the higher the index Shows that the fund has performed better. Therefore, an analysis of 
the two types of funds in the direction of the Treynor can show that enhanced funds have a higher rate of return 
than passive funds under a certain level of risk. The use of the Jensen ratio mainly provides a more scientific way 
to measure the excess return rate of the fund. It can be seen from the above figure that the distribution of the Jensen 
ratio of passive funds is relatively small, mainly concentrated between 0 and 1.25×10^(-4), while the distribution 
of the enhanced fund index is mainly concentrated between 1.25×10^(-4) and 3.75×10^(-4), enhanced funds are 
more likely to create excess returns for investors. 
The information ratio mainly measures the risk-adjusted excess return of a certain investment portfolio better 
than a specific index. The larger the information ratio, the higher the excess return per unit of the fund manager’s 
tracking error. Therefore, funds with a high information ratio usually have better performance. It can be seen from 
the figure above that the information ratio of enhanced funds in the overall distribution is slightly higher than that 
of passive funds, but the difference is not obvious. 
Table 1 uses different indicators to compare the performance of two different types of funds, from the 
perspective of the respective evaluation indicators of different types of funds. The performance of enhanced funds 
is better than passive funds to a certain extent. 
The fourth column is the comparison between enhanced and passive funds. From the difference of the tracking 
error (absolute value algorithm, standard deviation algorithm), the difference using the two algorithms is 0.0011 
and 0.0017, and significance level of both is 99%, indicating that the difference in tracking errors between the two 
funds is obvious, and the passive funds must have better performance. The difference in beta between enhanced 
funds and passive funds is -0.0633, and it is significant at the 95% level, indicating that passive funds bear higher 
potential risks than enhanced funds. The Sharpe Ratio and Treynor ratio are both positive in the comparison of 
enhanced funds and passive funds, and are significant at the 99% level, indicating that enhanced funds have greater 
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ability to adjust to market changes and the rate of return per unit risk. good performance. However, the difference 
between the two types of funds in the Jensen ratio and the information ratio is not significant, and it is difficult to 
draw an exact conclusion based on this. 
 
1.2 Index fund categories and investment performance 
Figure 4 shows the core density map of the performance indicators of various index funds, which is used to 
compare the distribution of four different index funds (stock type, bond type, commodity type and QDII) under 
different performance indicators. The higher in the nuclear density map, which means the more concentrated the 
data， the more samples; otherwise, the more scattered. The distribution of the sample can be seen in the nuclear 
density map, and then we can make a rough judgment on different index funds. However, under certain indicators, 
the gap between various index funds is small. It is impossible to draw conclusions just by looking at the nuclear 
density map. Further performance analysis is necessary. 
In terms of tracking error, stock funds>commodity funds>bond funds; bond funds have higher risk of adjusted 
excess returns. Table 2 lists the mean value of stock, bond and commodity investment performance indicators and 
the mean difference between the two groups. Whether it is the absolute value method or the standard deviation 
method, stock funds have the largest tracking error, followed by commodity funds, and bond funds have the 
smallest tracking error. In addition, we found that the beta value of bond funds is smaller than the other two types 
of funds, and its Sharpe ratio is larger than the other two types of funds, and the difference in the mean is significant 
at the 1% level. This shows that the correlation between the bond fund's yield and the tracking target index’s yield 
is relatively small, but per unit risk exposure will produce more excess returns. Similar to this indicator is the 
Jensen ratio. The Jensen ratio of bond funds is significantly larger than the other two types of funds. The 
information ratio is used to measure the level of risk-adjusted excess return of a certain investment portfolio better 
than a specific index. We have also reached a similar conclusion that the risk-adjusted excess return of bond funds 
is higher. 
Generally speaking, the average value of most performance indicators differs significantly among different 
types of index funds, but the difference of the Treynor ratio between between different types of index funds is not 
very significant. This may be because the Treynor ratio assumes that the fund can fully diversify the non-systematic 
risk of the investment portfolio, and the non-systematic risk is 0. In actual investment, the fund cannot completely 
diversify the non-systematic risk. This way makes the evaluation effect of this indicator greatly reduced. 
 
1.3 The distribution characteristics of index fund managers and management companies 
The fund managers of index funds are mostly men. As shown in Figure 5, among the fund managers (1776 people) 
of all index funds, there are 403 women, accounting for 22.7%; there are 1,373 men, accounting for 77.3%. Among 
them, there are 1,025 male fund managers with the first signature of an index fund, accounting for 74.9%, and 344 
female fund managers, accounting for 25.1%. Among the fund managers with second and third signature of an 
index fund, there are 348 males, accounting for 85.5%, and 59 females, accounting for 14.5%. It can be seen that 
men account for a larger proportion of fund managers. 
Most fund managers of index funds have a master's degree. As shown in Figure 6, among the fund managers 
of all index funds (1776), 93 fund managers have a bachelor degree, accounting for 5.2%; and 280 fund managers 
with a doctoral degree, accounting for 15.8%; most fund managers have master degrees, and there are 1403 people, 
accounting for 79%. Among the fund managers with the first signature of an index, 83 and 240 fund managers 
with bachelor's degree and doctoral degree, accounting for 6.1% and 17.5%, respectively, and 1,046 fund managers 
with master's degree, accounting for 76.4%. Among the fund managers with the second and third signature in an 
index fund, 10 and 40 managers have a bachelor's degree and a doctoral degree respectively, accounting for 2.5% 
and 9.8%, respectively. There are 357 fund managers with a master's degree, accounting for 87.7%. 
 
2. Analysis on factors affecting indexing investment performance 
2.1 Problems in fund governance 
2.1.1 Principal-agent and separation of two rights 
The main problem to be solved by fund governance is the agency problem under the separation of ownership and 
management. As an indirect financing method, the fund has a two-level contractual arrangement to reflect the 
entrust relationship, whether it is a corporate fund or a contractual fund. The first level is embodied in the fund 
holder (ultimate client) handing over assets to the fund management company to set a investment portfolio; the 
second level is embodied in the fund management company entrusting the fund assets to the company’s manager 
(fund manager) to operate. The endogenous two-tier agency relationship of the fund produces information 
asymmetry among fund holders, fund management companies, and fund managers, which can lead to behaviors 
such as net worth manipulation, insider trading, and related party transactions, which make the fund reflect the 
interests of fund managers rather than fund holders in the actual operation process. The establishment and 
implementation of incentive and restraint mechanisms are important means to improve fund performance. Fund 
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governance is to reduce agency costs and agency risks by establishing a set of reasonable governance structures 
and effective governance mechanisms to achieve the goal of checks and balances of power and scientific decision-
making. 
There are severe insider control problems in the fund industry of China, which are mainly manifested in: On 
the one hand, fund managers ignore the interests of fund investors for their own interests. The fund manager has 
the right to operate and control, and its goal is to maximize the net asset value of the fund in order to extract more 
management fees, but the net asset value of the fund is not equal to profits realized by the fund. On the other hand, 
large shareholders harm the interests of small shareholders. Because the fund’s equity is dispersed and the degree 
of equity concentration is not high, the cost of a single fund holder’s participation in fund governance is greater 
than the benefits he obtains, so his optimal strategy is to wait for people with higher fund shares to participate in 
fund governance. Under normal circumstances, when the “free rider” idea of small and medium fund share holders 
exists for a long time, large shareholders will use this control to implement related-party transactions and other 
behaviors. 
The main reason for the problem of internal control of funds in our country is the excessive dispersion of fund 
holders. Most fund holders have a "free rider" mentality, so it is difficult to convene a fund holder meeting. The 
process and procedures for changing fund managers and custodians are more complicated. This makes it 
impossible for existing fund holders meeting to carry out the supervisory function of the fund manager and the 
independent selection function of the fund custodian. Therefore, China urgently needs to improve the governance 
system of funds to protect the interests of investors. 
2.1.2 Information asymmetry 
Compared with investors, fund managers have information advantages. Information asymmetry theory means that 
in market activities, various types of people participating in the market have different levels of understanding of 
relevant information, and participants who have relatively sufficient information are often in an active position, 
while those who lack information are in a relative passive position. The theory believes that the seller in the market 
knows more about the full range of information about the product than the buyer; the seller (the party with the 
larger amount of information) can make a profit in the market by passing information with certain value to the 
buyer (the party with the smaller amount of information); The buyer and seller with less information will try to 
obtain information from the other.As far as the securities investment market in China is concerned, the problem 
of information asymmetry is not only reflected in the amount of information, but more importantly, in the accuracy 
of the information obtained, so it has a certain particularity. Judging from the actual situation of fund companies 
in China, the information of funds is mainly disclosed in the form of quarterly financial statements, and the 
distribution of the main investment targets in the investment portfolio is only mentioned in the semi-annual and 
annual reports. Therefore, during the semi-annual report and annual report disclosure period, investors cannot 
obtain any information about the fund's investment structure. This allows fund managers to obtain certain 
information advantages. 
2.1.3 Incomplete contract 
Incomplete contract theory believes that due to the limited rationality of the market, the asymmetry of information, 
and the uncertainty of transactions, the cost of determining all special powers is too high. Therefore, it is impossible 
to draw up a complete contract. Incomplete contracts are inevitable and universal. Therefore, there is a struggle 
for residual control of assets. When the contract is incomplete, it is efficient to allocate residual control rights to 
the party whose investment decision is relatively important. 
For China, all funds belong to the category of contractual funds. Fund holders and fund management 
companies sign contracts to entrust funds to fund management companies for investment management; at the same 
time, fund management companies sign contracts with fund managers on behalf of fund holders, and fund 
management companies sign contracts with fund custodians and other institutions. Fund companies are 
undoubtedly in the most critical position as fund management party. 
In China, the fund management company is both the sponsor of the fund and the manager of the fund, and it 
is obliged to formulate various contract clauses related to fund investment. When there is a situation that is not 
stipulated in the contract, the fund company has almost all residual control rights, which can easily lead to self-
interested behavior when the fund company exercises the residual control rights, thereby damaging the interests 
of fund holders. At the same time, since the fund holders are mainly ordinary investors, the information asymmetry 
exacerbates this disadvantage, and they cannot judge whether the fund company has any behavior that harms the 
interests of investors when exercising residual control rights. This is the first that is the default of the fund manager. 
Although this kind of situation is bad, it is not common, so the harm is relatively low and controllable. There is 
another situation that is more common and the hidden harm is more serious. We usually call it the "inaction" 
situation of the fund manager. When the market changes drastically, it is often difficult for fund companies to 
respond in time, especially when conflicts of interest occur within the company, and the fund manager as the actual 
operator of the fund is the most direct exerciser of residual control rights, in order to protect its own interests from 
infringement, fund managers will often act aggressively or wait and see, which indirectly brings losses to investors. 
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2.2 The impact of fund governance structure on investment performance 
There is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and investment 
performance. Institutional investors have sufficient information resources and are more sensitive to market 
responses. Therefore, when institutional investors hold more shares of the fund, it will put some pressure on the 
fund management company to strengthen the effect of external supervision and improve fund performance. When 
more fund shares are held by institutional investors, it has the effect of external supervision, which can prompt 
fund managers to disclose fund information in a more timely and accurate manner, accelerate dispersion and 
reduction of non-systematic risks, and promote increasing the average excess rate of return caused by unit tracking 
errors, thereby improving investment performance. However, in China, fund holders' shares are too scattered and 
the degree of concentration is not high, which restricts the improvement of investment performance to a certain 
extent. 
 
2.3 The impact of fund managers and fund company characteristics on investment performance 
In the process of indexing investment, the fund manager is the direct manager of the fund, which determines the 
investment direction and investment timing of the fund, and the personal characteristics of the fund manager such 
as experience, education background, age, gender, etc. may affect the fund investment direction and timing of 
investment. 
Female fund managers can significantly reduce the level of risk-taking, and a higher degree of education does 
not mean a higher return on investment, but means stronger risk control ability. Because men and women have 
different tolerances for risk, which has a certain impact on investment styles, many scholars have conducted 
research on the gender and performance of fund managers. The results show that men trade more frequently than 
women and are more confident excessively than women. Compared with men, women are more risk-averse and 
less self-confident, so the net income of the fund should be higher; fund managers with rich experience and 
doctorates have more advantages in risk control. 
Fund companies play an important role in the investment process, and the different characteristics of fund 
companies have an impact on fund performance. The proportion of independent directors, the proportion of major 
shareholders’ shareholding, and the proportion of financial shareholders will all have a positive impact on fund 
performance. The study found that in the board of directors of a fund management company, the greater the 
proportion of independent directors with professional knowledge and experience in the total number of board 
members, the higher the fund performance and the lower the net asset expense ratio. There is a certain relationship 
between the company’s equity structure and fund performance: a certain degree of equity concentration can 
promote the improvement of fund performance; the proportion of major shareholders, the control of major 
shareholders, and the proportion of financial shareholders will all have a positive impact on fund performance. By 
establishing a multiple linear regression model, scholars have studied the relationship between the equity structure 
of management companies and fund performance in China’s securities investment funds, and have come to the 
following conclusions. Firstly, major shareholders can promote fund performance. The largest shareholder’s 
advantage in holding is more obvious, and this kind of promotion effect is better. Increasing the number of minority 
shareholders under the premise of high equity concentration can strengthen the supervision effect and improve the 
performance of the fund. Secondly, the fund performance of fund companies with a background of securities firm 
holding is better; foreign holdings do not have a significant impact on fund performance. Thirdly, the larger the 
scale, the better the performance of fund management companies, indicating that there is still a scale effect in 
China’s fund management companies. The larger the scale of the company, the better resources, such as fund 
managers with higher capabilities, more timely and accurate information, etc., so there will be more funds with 
better performance. 
 
2.4 The impact of stock selection ability and timing ability on investment performance 
The capital invested by fund holders is a prerequisite for the growth of fund performance. What really enables the 
fund to achieve wealth growth is the professional knowledge possessed by the fund manager and the degree of 
application of this knowledge. The capital of fund holders has a strong dependence on human capital of fund 
managers. In the process of fund investment, the fund manager’s stock selection ability and timing ability have an 
important impact on investment performance. 
The timing ability of the fund manager means that the fund manager proactively increases the β value of the 
investment portfolio before the market strengthens based on his own prediction of the future development trend of 
the capital market, so as to obtain more income from the market rise. When the market is predicted to weaken, the 
fund manger take the initiative to lower the β value to avoid asset shrinkage caused by systemic risks, so that 
excess returns can be obtained under the two-way market trend. The stock selection ability of a fund manager 
means that the fund manager can identify those investment objects in the market that have been incorrectly valued 
relative to the industry or economic conditions, buy when the object is undervalued, and sell when the target is 
overvalued, so as to enable the asset portfolio to obtain excess returns that exceed the market. If the fund manager 
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has the ability to select stocks and timing, the funds he manages will have higher investment efficiency. The 
empirical results show that open-end fund managers have certain timing and stock selection capabilities, but not 
significant; stock fund managers have relatively strong stock selection and timing capabilities in a bull market; in 
the case of multiple style classifications, most value and growth funds have timing ability. 
 
3. Analysis on factors affecting indexing investment performance 
3.1 Data source 
Research data comes from Wind database (WIND) and Guotaian database (CSMAR). The sample covers 822 
index funds from 2008 to 2019. After deleting the samples with less than 100 trading days in one year and removing 
the missing values, a total of 2257 observations were obtained. Stata15 is used for data processing and regression 
analysis. 
 
3.2 Variables and descriptive statistics 
Indexing investment performance is the explained variable of the study. Among them, tracking error (absolute 
value method and standard deviation method) TE (abs) and TE (sd) are used to measure passive investment 
performance, and beta coefficient (beta) and Sharpe ratio(sharpe), Treynor ratio (treynor), Jensen ratio (jensen), 
information ratio (inf), characterize active investment performance. In addition, referring to the analysis in the 
second part of this article, the explanatory variables screen indicators from three levels mainly: fund governance 
structure, fund manager characteristics, and fund company attributes. The fund governance structure mainly 
includes institutional holding ratio (ins) and fund management company self-holding ratio (fund); fund manager 
characteristics mainly include manager gender (female), manager education (doc/bac), manager timing ability 
(mta), and manager stock selection ability (ssa); the attributes of fund companies mainly include the number of 
funds under the fund company (ln(numfund)) and the number of fund managers under the fund company 
(ln(numman)). In order to control the impact of other factors on indexing investment performance, referring to 
existing research, this part of the research also controls the international financial environment (iefei), domestic 
economic policies (depi), investor sentiment(conf), and fund size (ln(asset)), reweight unit net asset value (nav) 
and other related control variables. Specific variable definitions and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4 (see Appendix). 
 
3.3 Fund governance structure and investment performance 
The regression results with passive investment performance as the explained variable show that the ins coefficient 
is -0.038 and is significant at the 1% level, indicating that the fund tracking error is significantly negatively 
correlated with the institutional holding ratio. As the institutional holding ratio increases, the tracking error of the 
fund will gradually decrease. But the tracking error of the fund has a significant positive correlation with the fund 
management company’s self-holding ratio (fund), indicating that the self-holding behavior of the fund 
management company may cause the fund to deviate from the underlying index. Regarding the control variables, 
tracking error is significantly negatively correlated with fund size (ln(asset)), significantly positively correlated 
with investor sentiment (conf), and significantly negatively correlated with international macro financial 
environment (iefei). 
The regression results with passive investment performance as the explained variable show that the regression 
coefficient of institutional holding ratio (ins) and beta is -0.051, and it is significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
institutional holders can reduce the sensitivity of fund investment performance. Institutional holding ratio and 
sharpe ratio and inf both show a significantly positive correlation, indicating that compared with individual 
investors, institutional investors have advantages in professional skills, information channels, etc., which have a 
positive effect on the performance of active investment. 
 
3.4 Fund managers and investment performance 
The regression results using passive investment performance as the explained variable show that although the 
female coefficient is not significant, the coefficients are all negative. To a certain extent, when the fund manager 
is a female, the tracking error of passive investment is small, which is different from the consistent understanding 
that women are more cautious than men. In addition, the doc coefficients of the results are 0.024 and 0.036 
respectively, and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, indicating that highly educated fund managers may not 
completely copy the underlying index components when conducting passive investment fund portfolios, but 
making use of their knowledge, adding more non-replicating components. 
The regression result with active investment performance as the explained variable shows that the female 
coefficient is -0.014 and is significant at the 5% level, indicating that the funds managed by female fund managers 
are less sensitive to target index fluctuations than men. Although the Treynor ratio is not significant for female, it 
is negative, indicating that the performance of funds managed by female may be lower after considering only 
systematic risks. However, the sharpe ratio and the female coefficient are positive and the information ratio and 
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the female coefficient are positive, indicating that after excluding non-systematic risks and risk adjustment, the 
performance of funds managed by female is better. 
 
3.5 Stock selection ability, timing ability and investment performance 
The regression result with passive investment performance as the explained variable shows that the mta coefficient 
is -0.144 and is significant at the 5% level, indicating that the fund manager’s stock selection ability is significantly 
negatively correlated with tracking error. The stronger the stock selection ability, the degree of deviation from the 
tracking target is smaller. The ssa coefficient is 0.055 and is significant at the level of 10%, indicating that the 
timing ability of the fund manager is significantly positively correlated with the tracking error. The stronger the 
timing ability is, the greater passive investment deviates from the tracking target. 
The regression results with active investment performance as the explained variable show that the mta 
coefficient is -0.764 and is significant at the 1% level, indicating that the fund manager’s stock selection ability 
can effectively reduce the fund’s sensitivity to target index fluctuations. The beta and ssa show a significant 
positive correlation, indicating that the fund manager's timing ability not only cannot reduce the fund's sensitivity 
to target index fluctuations, but also increases the sensitivity to a certain extent. After considering only systematic 
risks, the stronger the fund manager's stock selection ability is, the worse the fund is allocated. When both 
systematic and non-systematic risks are considered, the stronger the fund manager's ability to select stocks is, the 
better the fund he allocates. This positive correlation can also be established by using the Jensen ratio. Regarding 
the timing ability of the fund, no matter what performance evaluation method exists, the coefficients of ssa are 
positive, and most of them are significant at the 1% level. It shows that the timing ability of fund managers can 
significantly improve the performance of fund allocation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
First, this article analyzes the current status of indexing investment performance in China and the characteristics 
of fund managers and fund management companies. Second, it also theoretically analyzes the influence of these 
factors on indexing investment performance in terms of fund governance structure, characteristics of fund 
managers and fund companies, stock selection ability and timing ability. Finally, it uses multiple regression 
analysis from three dimensions mentioned above to verify the influencing factors on investment performance. The 
results show that in terms of passive investment, fund tracking error is significantly negatively correlated with 
institutional holdings and fund managers’ stock selection ability, and significantly positively correlated with fund 
managers’ timing ability. Female fund managers’ tracking errors are smaller. Institutional investors play a positive 
role in promoting the performance of active investment. The fund manager’s stock selection ability can effectively 
reduce the fund’s sensitivity to target index fluctuations, and the fund manager’s timing ability can significantly 
improve the performance of fund allocation. , Funds allocated by female fund managers will be less sensitive to 




Figure 1. Market trends of the CSI 300 Index in 2019 
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Figure 3. Comparison of passive and enhanced index fund performance indicators 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  




Figure 4. Distribution of performance indicators of various types of index funds 
 
 
Figure 5. Index funds-gender distribution of fund managers 
 
 
Figure 6. Index Fund-Fund Manager's Educational Qualification Distribution 
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Table 1. Performance comparison of CSI 300 index enhanced and passive index funds 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Enhanced Passive Enhanced vsPassive 
TE(abs) 
0.0019 0.0008 0.0011*** 
(0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
TE(sd) 
0.0030 0.0013 0.0017*** 
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
Beta 
0.8583 0.9216 -0.0633** 
(0.1724) (0.0601) (0.0281) 
Sharpe Ratio 
0.1145 0.1005 0.0141*** 
(0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0041) 
Treynor 
0.0014 0.0012 0.0002*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Jensen 
0.0002 0.0001 0.0001*** 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Information 
Ratio 
0.3552 -0.2793 0.6345 
(3.2874) (1.3664) (0.5450) 
Observations 57 41 98 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2. Performance Comparison of Various Index Funds 








Stock vs  
Bond 
Stock vs  
Commdity 
Bond vs  
Commdity 
TE(abs) 
0.0017 0.0006 0.0008 0.0011*** 0.0009*** -0.0002** 
(0.0022) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
TE(sd) 
0.0028 0.0010 0.0013 0.0019*** 0.0015*** -0.0004** 
(0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Beta 
0.8996 0.6987 0.9169 0.2009*** -0.0173 -0.2182*** 
(0.1671) (0.3952) (0.1599) (0.0096) (0.0171) (0.0408) 
Sharpe Ratio 
0.0094 0.2275 0.0184 -0.2181*** -0.0090 0.2091*** 
(0.0849) (0.1869) (0.0733) (0.0048) (0.0087) (0.0193) 
Treynor 
0.0034 0.0003 0.0001 0.0030 0.0032 0.0002* 
(0.2252) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0105) (0.0229) (0.0001) 
Jensen 
0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Information 
Ratio 
0.0690 0.3068 -0.0866 -0.2379*** 0.1556 0.3934* 
(1.7093) (2.1324) (1.6523) (0.0848) (0.1751) (0.2297) 
Observations 4,904 466 97 5,370 5,001 563 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3. Definitions of Variables 
Symbols of variables Names of variables 
Explianed variables 
（indexing investment performance） 
() Tracking error（absolute value method） 
() Tracking error（standard deviation method） 
	
 Beta coefficient 
ℎ	 Sharpe ratio 

	 Treynor ratio 
		 Jensen ratio 
 Information ratio 
Exlanatory variables 
（fund governance structure） 
 Institutional holding 
 Holding by fund management company 
Explanatory variables 
（charactristics of fund managers and 
fund companies） 
		 The fund manager is a female 
 The fund manager is a PHD 
 The fund manger is a bachelor 
ln () The number of funds 
ln() The number of fund managers 
Explanatory variables 
（timing and stock selection ability） 

 Timing ability 
 Stock selection ability 
Control Variables 
 Reweighting unit net asset value  
ln (	
) Volume of funds 
 Investor’s emotion 
	 Domestic economic policy 
		 International financial environment 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
	  	    	 ! 
() 2257 0.12 0.136 0.00 0.08 1.75 
() 2257 0.21 0.256 0.00 0.12 2.45 
	
 2257 0.91 0.137 0.01 0.94 1.39 
ℎ	 2257 0.03 0.094 -0.26 0.02 0.54 

	 2257 0.01 0.120 -0.72 0.02 1.41 
		 2257 0.00 0.025 -0.37 0.01 0.15 
 2257 0.06 1.714 -22.62 0.00 35.96 
 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
	  	    	 ! 
 2257 0.38 0.350 0.00 0.25 1.00 
 2257 0.03 0.128 0.00 0.00 1.00 
		 2257 0.28 0.447 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 2257 0.23 0.419 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 2257 0.05 0.227 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ln () 2257 4.84 0.587 1.61 5.03 5.39 
ln() 2257 3.60 0.477 1.10 3.81 4.11 

 2257 0.00 0.049 -0.46 -0.00 1.00 
 2257 0.02 0.091 -1.00 0.02 0.78 
 
Panel C: Control Variables 
	  	    	 ! 
 2257 1.26 2.548 0.26 1.05 118.93 
ln (	
) 2257 19.78 1.724 15.21 19.60 24.56 
 2257 54.63 4.094 44.77 54.13 62.24 
	 2257 60.21 7.121 46.54 56.92 76.80 
		 2257 44.82 6.685 23.02 49.60 53.74 
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Table 5. Fund governance structure and investment performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 () () 	
 ℎ	 
	 		  
 
-0.038*** -0.052*** -0.051*** 0.032*** 0.001 0.002 0.326*** 
(-4.47) (-3.39) (-4.99) (5.88) (0.21) (1.32) (2.74) 
 
0.083*** 0.112** -0.065** -0.026** -0.031** -0.010** 0.071 
(2.75) (2.33) (-1.98) (-2.19) (-2.35) (-2.44) (0.32) 
 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
(-1.56) (-1.54) (-0.14) (0.66) (0.37) (0.73) (-0.26) 
 (	
) 
-0.004** -0.011*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.003** -0.000 0.029 
(-2.11) (-3.44) (1.42) (4.98) (2.37) (-0.72) (1.41) 
 
0.006** 0.017*** 0.002 0.002 0.009*** -0.001* 0.010 
(2.42) (2.95) (0.88) (1.30) (4.01) (-1.84) (0.32) 
	 
-0.000 -0.002 -0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.013 
(-0.35) (-0.87) (-4.48) (6.72) (3.23) (2.82) (-0.98) 
		 
-0.002*** -0.004** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.002 




-0.022 -0.166 0.995*** -0.568*** -0.854*** 0.025** -0.287 
(-0.33) (-1.21) (16.16) (-15.98) (-15.83) (2.06) (-0.37) 
# 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 
t statistics in parentheses   
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 6. Characteristics and investment performance of fund managers and fund companies 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7. Stock selection ability, timing ability and investment performance 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
